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This thesis examines the practicality of using an expert system approach in
designing an intelligent air defense system to assist the Officer in Tactical
Command (OTC) onboard a ship to make efficient and accurate decisions in
critical situations in the battlefield. We analyzed modern anti-ship weapons and
the counterattack measures. We also formalized some of the decision making
processes and designed a computer simulation system. The system receives
preprocessed sensor input, determines what contacts are present, performs target
analysis and correlation based on current tactical situation, and suggests the best
possible actions to take. The simulation results showed that the system can be
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Today's navies are facing an unprecedented challenge in modern warfare.
Since the Second World War, the task of protecting a naval force from aerial
attack has been recognized as an enormous undertaking. In earlier days, a
critical condition for a battle ship's survival lay in its ability to implement and
execute complicated procedures for defending against a myriad of torpedoes and
dive bombers escorted by fighters.
At present, sophisticated attack aircrafts will not appear in large numbers as
they did before. But what makes them vastly different from the aircraft of the
past is the quantum leap in all aspects from performance to firepower. Gone are
those rudimentary iron bombs and torpedoes which were used to cripple naval
vessels. Instead, they have been replaced by "smart weapons" carrying the most
destructive warheads ever.
The necessity for aircraft to maneuver to bring their weapons to bear on a
target is a thing of the past as more effective weapons can now be released at
stand-off ranges. More importantly, modern anti-ship weapons can cruise at
slightly above wave height and at transonic speeds, making early detection
difficult, if not impossible. This translates into a sharp reduction of time allowed
for a ship to organize the appropriate countermeasures. The time for reaction
will be further reduced as future weapons become available that can maneuver at
supersonic speed.
Expert systems have been successfully constructed for applications to a wide
range of problems such as medical diagnosis, industrial process control, and air
traffic control. It is desirable that one be constructed to advise the Officer in
Tactical Commend (OTC) in critical operations in a tactical environment. In a
highly dynamic tactical environment, major decisions have to be made by one
naval officer, the OTC, who is required to respond to a vast amount of diverse
information, received from a multitude of sensors, in an extremely time critical
and high pressure situation. In addition to the OTC's experience, an expert
system with combat direction capabilities would be a valuable tool to help the
OTC respond in a timely manner, to a wide variety of adverse situations. In this
thesis, we report the design and implementation of a system that is aimed at
providing support to the tactical commander of a ship in air defense warfare.
B. PROBLEM
The reasons for using an expert system to aid decision making in tactical air
defense warfare are as follows:
• The increased speed of weapons systems has reduced the time available
for making tactical decisions by human decision makers. This requires
greater capabilities to meet the incoming threats and can be partially
automated through the use of computers.
• Weapons technology has progressed to the point that no single human
decision maker can be proficient in all offensive and defensive options;
even if such an expert exists, there will not be enough time for him to
absorb all information and execute all decisions without any error.
• In the area of military tactical operations, knowledge and data are
closely related in the decision making process.
• A tactical situation is usually presented to the OTC with a view of the
"state of the world". This view can be inaccurate. Nonetheless, based on
this incomplete information he must make decisions subject to the
constraints imposed by preplanned actions.
C. APPROACH
The above discussion illustrates the need for using an intelligent expert
system to help the decision making process. This process consists of three
phases: acquisition, analysis and decision. In the acquisition phase, the expert
system receives data from various sensors, intelligence resources, or human
interfaces, and storing that information in its dynamic database. In the analysis
phase, the expert system scans its database for possible information, performs
necessary calculations to verify correlation, and updates its database as
appropriate. In the decision phase, the expert system indicates actions to take in
a given situation based on current directives which should be followed, or based
on similar situation which are familiar.
The remaining of the thesis is organized as follows: Chapter II analyzes the
characteristics of anti-ship weapons, Chapter III discusses the ship's
countermeasure tactics, Chapter IV defines an expert system structure and
Chapter V presents the system knowledge-rule base and for system simulations,
Chapter VI summarizes the work and suggests possible areas for further
research.
II. MODERN ANTI-SHIP WEAPONS
A. THE DEVELOPMENT OF ANTI-SHIP MISSILES
Anti-ship missiles (ASMs) are becoming one of the most effective weapons in
modern sea warfare. In the well-publicized instances when they were used
against contemporary naval vessels they were successful in penetrating the
defense and created severe damages. The first victim was the Israeli destroyer
Eilat which was sunk in 1967 during a naval encounter with the Egyptian Navy;
the second was the Royal Navy destroyer Sheffield during the Falkland Conflict;
and the latest was the USN frigate Stark in the Persian Gulf.
In the late '50s the Soviet-built Styx ASM was the first weapon of this kind.
Its first use in combat came as a total surprise and resulted in the sinking of the
Eilat. After 30 years this weapon is still in service but it has undergone
numerous technical improvements since its inception. Warheads, homing sensors
and guidance systems have been modernized and the range next to trajectory
performance have been enhanced. While the Styx has been retired from the
Soviet Navy it continues to exist in communist China under the name
"Silkworm". It has been in service with their Navy and in coastal defense. In
the Iranian Forces Silkworm ASMs are showing their effectiveness in the battle
for the oil resources and shipping routes in the Persian Gulf. In the '50s and '60s
the Western countries had no comparable armament for their vessels and several
crash programmes were initiated for closing this gap. By the early 70s several
Western ASM designs finally made their appearance with operational units. The
first was Israeli Aircraft Industries' Gabriel, closely succeeded by the French
Aerospatiale's Exocet. This was followed in the USA by the McDonnell Douglas
Harpoon. Also, the Italian firm OTO Melara and the French company Matra
together placed the ASM Otomat on the market. These weapons outperform
Styx in every aspect. But the Soviet did not remain idle and fielded a wide range
of new high performance ASMs.
Indeed, the current missile threat to naval ships is already formidable and
appears be growing more serious in the future. At the present the most advanced
ASMs feature a range between 15 and 300 km and can carry an explosive charge
of up to 300kg with a speed of close to l,000km/h. Depending on the intended
target the warhead can contain simply a high explosive charge or armor-piercing
shaped charges with self-adjusting fuzes which can penetrate virtually the thickest
steel on ships. Even for a heavily armored ship an ASM can, therefore, cause
severe damages and easily destroy or at least distort the armored flighted of an
attack carrier, thereby effectively terminating fixed-wing air operations for a
considerable length of time. The terminal attack trajectory of an ASM can also
be adjusted to achieve maximum damage to its target and to make defense against
it more difficult. For example, the missile can be programmed to climb to an
altitude close to the target and dive into it vertically from above.
Compared to other weapon systems ASMs are relatively light-weighted.
Together with compactness of the fire control equipment, it is practical to have
them installed on combat vessels as small as fast patrol boats and facilitates for
coastal defense tasks in the form of mobile batteries. Essentially ASMs can be
launched from any suitable platform. It may be a small or a large vessel, an
aircraft or a submarine. ASMs can therefore be regarded as ideal weapons for
naval warfare of today and the future. The combat potential of existing missiles
is constantly being improved. The latest models are equipped with "smart"
sensors which permit firing the weapons into the general direction of suspected
enemy forces without aiming it at a previously selected target. Prior to
launching the weapon's computer and sensors are programmed to search for and
identify a specific type of target. As soon as the ASM is within radar or visual
range of the opponent, the inboard computer is presented with a selection of
digitalises electronic images of the target. It rapidly compares the presented
image with those stored in its library and if one of these matches that of the pre-
programmed target it instructs the guidance system to attack it. Eventual
application of artificial intelligence is expected to provide future ASMs with
considerable decision making capability, including allowing avoidance of decoys
and providing for on-the-spot selection of the most valuable or most threatening
target.
Recent events have shown that the British destroyer Sheffied during the
Falkland Conflict in 1982 and the US frigate Stark in the Persian Gulf in 1987
were attacked by ASMs. .Even though these ships were equipped with anti-ASM
weapons, these weapons could not be brought to respond in the time to defend
against the attacking Exocet missiles. These two incidents illustrate that the
defensive responses of the attacked ship must be fast and accurate to avoid
serious casualties.
B. CHARACTERISTICS OF ANTI-SHIP MISSILS
Anti-ship missiles (ASMs) function by detecting the energy emitted or
reflected by the target, analyzing the information, and by logic systems of
varying degrees of complexity, determining the attack trajectory. They can be
subdivided into the following categories :
1. Radar Guidance Missile :
• Active and semi-active homing.
• Using the energy reflected by a target illuminated by an emitter
located inside the missile or externally.
2. Infrared/TV Guidance Missile :
• Passive homing.
• Using the actual energy radiated by the target ( optical, eletro-
optical,passive electromagnetic etc. ).
3. Anti-Radiation Missile :
• Directing the missiles on to the radar emissions of ships, in
particular navigation and surveillance radars.
• Probably will soon be able to attack fire control radars,
despite the difficulties of homing and tracking.
Future development of anti-ship missiles includes :
• Increase in launching distance.
• Improvement in the discretion and mobility of launching
installations.
• Improved co-ordination between sea-skimming and diving
attacks.
• Reduction of radar cross section by reducing missile
dimensions and improving their shape.
• Reduction of infrared signatures by using more discrete modes
of propulsion (ramjets, special propellants) and by non-
propelled final trajectories.
• Increase in speed, currently Mach 0.9; rapid attainment of
Mach 3.0 must be predicted.
• Increase in missile maneuvering.
• Programming of evasive action into attack trajectories.
• Increased efficiency of warheads with impact and proximity
fuzes.
• Use of sophisticated seekers with improved resistance to
countermeasures.
• Improvement of missile's resistance to hard-kill systems.
With these new features, one can conclude that detection of ASMs will
become more difficult, requiring more time and effort in air defense execution.
In addition, the effectiveness of hard-kill systems will be reduced against small,
robust and agile missiles. Finally, reaction time will be drastically reduced.
III. COUNTERMEASURE TACTICS AGAINST ANTI-SHIP
WEAPONS
A. COUNTERING MISSILE ATTACK
There are three feasible approaches to defend against ASMs : (1) launching a
preemptive strike against the source of the threat; (2) intercepting the missile in
flight over long-to-medium-range; and (3) Close-in Weapon System, the CIWS.
Traditional means of countering an air attack is done through layered
defense. Basically, this concept of defense involves several zones of engagement
starting from the far reaches of the outer air battle down to the innermost air








FIGURE 3-1 THE BASIC AIR DEFENSE ZONES
Each zone has a set of corresponding weapons assigned to it to reduce the
chance of an anti-ship missile reaching its target. This means that attackers are
successively employed in each zone by long-range, medium-range, and short-
range (or point defense) weapons and by close-in weapon systems (CIWS).
Ideally, it would be better to destroy an attacking platform before it could fire its
weapons.
Multi-layered defense requires several distinct weapon systems with different
capabilities and can be prohibitively expensive. Therefore, the degree of
protection varies according to the size of a navy and the number of layers it can
afford.
Although it is highly desirable to "kill" the platforms before missile firing,
no guarantee can be made that such action could always be successfully executed.
Failure to destroy the launching platform should result in the activation of either
the "soft-kill" (using decoys such as chaff or flares and other electronic
countermeasures) or "hard-kill" (anti-missile missiles or air defense guns)
measures or both to confront the incoming threat. Figure 3-2 shows the basic























FIGURE 3-2 BASIC DEFENSE TACTICS OF A SINGLE SHIP
The high-accuracy and high-agility of modern anti-ship missiles, with
relatively small radar cross-section, are rather difficult to detect. The ship
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being attacked will have little time to react. Relying solely on human operators
for target detection, acquisition, tracking, missile launch preparation, initiation
of the launching sequence, and assessment of target destruction (so that another
target would have to be engaged), will consumed too much precious time. One
should bear in mind that even a fraction of a second should not be wasted
considering that an attacking missile is only seconds away from impact. Time is
therefore a very critical factor if one is to avoid the havoc.
To speed up the reaction time, time-consuming human decision making
should be limited to critical decisions such as whether or not to attack. To
achieve this, Combat Directional Systems are being developed which automate
and integrate many shipboard systems.
B. BASIC DEFENSE TACTICS OF A SHIP
From Figure 3-2, a ship's defense against ASMs includes balancing
capabilities of hard-kill and soft-kill, of active and passive measures and of point
and area coverages with the mechanics and logic of the tactical interaction
between defending and tracking weapons systems.
The attacking cycle depends first on detecting adversary. Detection will be
made by either active or passive means. Active detection includes radar,
acoustic and infrared as well as direct and indirect means such as tracking radar
receives its own radar wave reflected from the target. Passive detection includes
detecting the active radar, electron acoustic and other power sources such as
Electrical Counter Measure (ECM) from the would-be target. Passive measures
also include code-breaking and other intelligence related data leading to
detection.
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After initial detection is gained, specific location and identification are
usually necessary before weapons can be launched with any degree of confidence
of hitting their targets. Active detection and targeting sensors, in turn, are
subject to passive detection by the defense, thereby providing alert and warning.
Once a targeting solution is obtained (with sufficient confidence or reason to
shoot), weapons can be launched. The weapon must penetrate defense, detect,
identify and lock-on to its target, and then hit. During this process, of course, an
alerted and ready defense will be responding with a variety of hard- and soft-kill
measures and point and area defenses.
C. SELECTION OF THE COUNTERING WEAPONS
A battleship is equipped with hard-kill weapons, such as missiles and guns, to
defend itself by physically destroying the attackers. In addition, it will be fitted
with soft-kill equipment, such as Electronic Warfare equipment which can be
used in defense to confuse and deflect enemy hard-kill weapons. All these
facilities operate based on information provided by sensors and on directions
from the ship's combat center. Of course, they also require services such as
electrical power and cooling water.
The most effective weapons against missiles or aircrafts are anti-missile
missiles. Missiles which are launched from nearby enemy submarines or are at
low altitude are only detected at short range. Battleships also need protection
when such missiles are coming directly towards them. This protection is
essential if the ships are operating outside any area air defense. However, even
with the cover of area air defense, some missiles will succeed in penetraing the
defenses (In this thesis, we only consider point defense problems, omitting area
defense problems.). Point Defense Missile Systems (PDMS) (Figure 3-1) are
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designed to counter this threat. The incoming missile is detected by a radar, and
tracked by a Tracker radar. A point defense missile can be fired directly
towards its target and travels up a reference beam transmitted by the Tracker
towards the target. Mid-range guns can also be fired in time.
Missiles guns which successfully come within a short distance (2-3
kilometers) of the ship must be dealt with using the final "last-ditch" hard-kill
weapon, the anti-missile guns of the Close-in Weapon System (CIWSX Figure
3-1). These guns are small calibre radar-controlled guns, capable of firing short
bursts of a large number of rounds. They are designed to explode the warhead
of the incoming missile prematurely. Even if they achieve this, at such short
ranges some treatments will probably reach the ship but these will cause far less
damage than a warhead exploding within the ship.
D. DEVELOPMENT OF THE OPERATIONAL PROCEDURE
According to the above analysis of the characteristics of anti-ship weapons
and the ship's countering tactics, we can design an air defense operational
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In the air defense warfare, ship's active sensors (searching and tracking
radars) and passive sensors (ESM) supply the early warning for possible
intruders. The maximum defense range of the ship depends on the sensor's
maximum detection range. Ideally, the ESM equipments will intercept the threat
first.
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When the sensor's operators discover a target on the screen, the commander
must identify the target first. If the target is a friend, then the sensors should
ignore the target and continue their operation. If, on the other hand, the target is
unknown, the commander must determine if the target is hostile or not. If the
unknown target is heading towards the ship, the commander must assume that the
target is hostile and the ship must standby for fighting immediately. The
following sequence of the operational procedures should be executed, until the
target disappears.
• Analyze the target's parameters (such as velocity, bearing, intersection
size and noise status, etc.) and identify if the target is a fighter, missile
or just noise source.
• Use special ECM to decoy the target—decoys are real electronic targets,
and by far are the most potent form of ECM in providing protection to
ships by reducing the lethality of missile and causing them to miss their
targets.
• Fire anti-air weapons, if ECM fails to distract the hostile target. This
means that target are engaged in each zone by anti-air missiles, guns and
close-in weapon systems (CIWS).
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IV. DEFINING AN EXPERT SYSTEM STRUCTURE
A. FUNCTIONS OF AN EXPERT SYSTEM
To build an expert system one usually has to develop the following functions:
• Problem-solving functions capable of using domain-specific
knowledge which may require dealing with uncertainty.
• User-interaction function, which includes explanation of the
system's intensions and decisions during and after the problem-
solving process.
An expert system is a computer program that behaves like an expert in some,
usually narrow, domains of application. Typical applications include tasks such
as medical diagnosis, locating mechanical failures, or interpreting measurement
data. Expert systems are also called knowledge-based systems because they have
to possess domain-specific knowledge necessary for solving problems. An expert
system also has to be capable of explaining its reasoning and decisions to the
user, as human experts do. Such an explanation feature is especially necessary in
uncertain situations in order to enhance the user's confidence in the system's
advice, or to enable the user to detect a possible flaw in the system's reasoning.
Therefore, an expert system has to have a friendly user interface so that users
can interact easily with the system.
An additional feature that is often required of an expert system is the ability
to deal with uncertainty and incompleteness. Information about the problem to
be solved can be incomplete or unreliable; relations in the problem domain can
be approximate. For example, we may not be sure that some symptom is present
in the patient, or that some measurement data is absolutely correct; some drag
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may cause some problem, but usually does not. All this requires probabilities
reasoning.
B. MAIN STRUCTURE OF AN EXPERT SYSTEM
It is convenient to divide the development of an expert system into three
main modules, as illustrated in Figure 4-1:
• a knowledge base,
• an inference engine, and










FIGURE 4-1 THE STRUCTURE OF EXPERT SYSTEM
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A knowledge-base comprises the knowledge that is specific to the domain of
application, including such things as simple facts about the domain, rules that
describe relations or phenomena in the domain, and possibly also methods,
heuristics and ideas for solving problems in this domain. An inference engine
knows how to actively use the knowledge in the base. A user interface caters for
smooth communication between the user and the system. It also provide the user
with an insight into the problem-solving process carried out by the inference
engine. It is convenient to view the inference engine and the interface as one
module, usually called an expert system shell, or simply a shell for brevity.
C. WHO IS INVOLVED IN EXPERT SYSTEM CONSTRUCTION ?
The main players in the expert system game are the expert system, the
domain expert, the knowledge engineer, the expert-system-building tool, and the
























FIGURE 4-2 THE PLAYERS IN THE EXPERT SYSTEM GAME
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The expert system can be regarded as a collection of computer software that
solves problems in the domain of interest. It's called a system rather than just a
program because it contains both a problem-solving component and a support
component. This support environment helps the user interact with the main
program and may include sophisticated debugging aids to help the expert-system
builder test and evaluate the program's code, friendly editing facilities to help the
experts modify knowledge and data in the expert system, and advanced graphic
devices to help the user input and read information as the system is running.
The domain expert is an articulate, knowledgeable person with a reputation
for producing good solutions to problems in a particular field. The expert uses
heuristics and reasoning to search for a solution, and the expert system models
these problem-solving strategies. Although an expert system usually models one
or more experts, it may also contain expertise from other sources such as books
and journal articles.
The knowledge engineer is a human, usually with a background in computer
science and AI, who knows how to build expert systems. The knowledge
engineer interviews the experts, organizes the knowledge, decides how it should
be represented in the expert system, and may help programmers write the code.
An expert-system-building tool is the programming language and its
associated support facilities used by the knowledge engineer or programmer to
build expert systems. These tools differ from conventional programming
languages in that they provide convenient ways to represent complex, high-level
concepts.
The user is the human who uses the expert system once it is developed. The
term user is a bit ambiguous. It normally refers to the end-user, the person for
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whom the expert system was developed. However, in this thesis it will refer to
anyone who uses the expert system. As Figure 4-2 suggests, the user may be a
tool builder debugging the expert-system-building language, a knowledge
engineer refining the existing knowledge in the system, a domain expert adding
new knowledge to the system, an end-user relying on the system for advice, or a
member of the clerical staff adding data to the system.
D. STAGES OF EXPERT SYSTEM BUILDING
A key to success in building an expert system is starting small and building
incrementally to a significant functioning system. Empirical validation must be
carried out at various stages of the refinement progress.
1. Initial Knowledge Base Design Stage:
This comprises three principal stages:
a. Problem Definition:
Which includes the specification of goal, constraints, resources,
participants and their roles.
b. Conceptualization:
Which includes a detailed description of the problem, decomposing
tasks into subproblems, elements of each subproblems (in terms of hypotheses,
data, and intermediate reasoning concepts), and how these conceptualizations
affect possible implementation.
c. Computer Representation of the problem:
Which includes specific choice of representations for the elements
identified during the conceptualization phase. This is the first phase that requires
computer implementation. Questions regarding information flow and articulation
of the concepts and data will be raised more completely at this stage.
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2. Prototype Development and Testing Stage:
Once the representation has been chosen, we can begin to design and
implement a prototype system. The choice of subset is crucial: it must include a
representative sample of the knowledge that is typical of the overall model, yet it
must involve subtasks and reasoning that are sufficiently simple to test. Once the
prototype produces acceptable results, it can be expanded to include more
detailed variants of the problems it must solve. Then it will be tested with more
complex cases that will be used as a standard test set for subsequent refinement of
the knowledge base. Many adjustments of the primitive elements and their
relationships are bound to come about as the result of this testing.
3. Refinement and Generalization of the Knowledge Base:
This stage can take a considerable amount of time if we expect to reach
truly expert level performance.
E. A KNOWLEDGE-BASED SYSTEM FOR NAVAL AIR DEFENSE
We have discussed what the expert system is, how it could be implemented,
and the importance of expert systems in naval command and control affairs.
This chapter discusses how the expert system works in the ship's air defense
combat system.
The proliferation of threats to the safety of modern battleships since World
War II has tended to outstrip the ability of ship's combat systems to defend them,
leaving them vulnerable to a determined, co-ordinated attack. Naval warfare has
increasingly become a long range affair. From underwater, air curise missiles
may be launched, and above the water missiles may be launched to home in on
infrared or electro-magnetic emissions. Some missiles are also able to use their
own radar in the final phase of the attack, approaching from any direction and
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from sea level zenith. The key to effectively handling the modern threat is to
manage the relevant information and produce an accurate, comprehensive picture
of the area surrounding a surface ship. The size of the area covered will
obviously depend upon the threat.
The modern battleship has an impressive array of sensing equipments: (1)
Radars: there are two or three tracking radars optimized for short range high
definition work, and one or more searching radars for long range air warning.
(2) Sonars: passive sonars detect passively that have good ability to detecting
submarines at very long range such as towed arrays, and active sonars with
complex signal processing effective at medium and short range and for weapon
control. (3) Electronic warfare equipments: ESM equipments intercept enemy's
electro-magnetic emissions. In addition, there are electro-optic sensors, reports
received by radio, and background intelligence information.
In order to compile the picture it is necessary for the shipboard systems to
detect, locate, track and, if possible, classify all objects, which might possibly
contribute to the tactical situation. The tactical data link will be used to add
objects seen from other units of the force. All the information then has to be
interpreted, collated and fused to form one comprehensive force tactical picture.
Commander cognitive overload, as it is known, is widely recognized as a key
problem. The increasing volume of incoming information must, nevertheless, be
assimilated, interpreted and assessed by the Officer of Tactical Command (OTC).
It is, therefore, desirable that the OTC receives automated decision aids. These
aids will not only support the gathering and classification of available
information in a timely manner, but also provide, to the OTC, an effective
29
presentation of the resulting tactical picture with necessary explanations,
assessments and recommendations for action.
According to the above analysis, we have designed a structure of ship's air




















FIGURE 4-3 THE STRUCTURE OF SHIP'S AIR DEFENSE
KNOWLEDGEBASE SYSTEM
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This system consists of the following units:
1. Interface Control Unit :
The primary of role of the interface control unit is the exchange of data
between the ship combat system and the air defense expert system. The
interface control unit accepts data from commander via expert system and sends
orders to the combat system. Feedback from sensors/weapons are returned to
the expert system for processing and display to the commander.
2. Display Unit (input/output unit) :
This module will provide a means of control by the commander as well
as output for both the knowledge based system and the tactical situation. The
operator will be able to interrogate the system to determine the reasoning behind
an assessment or recommendation and, if necessary, to monitor or provide
decision-making inputs.
3. Control Computer :
This is the center of the whole structure. The responsibilities of the
control computer is to supervise the status of all weapons and sensor units, and to
supply decision-making supports that take into consideration different situations
and operational procedure rules.
4. Knowledge Data Base :
This module is the source of "knowledge" which stores the operational
procedure rules for control computer inferencing, allocating, and consulting.
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V THE DESIGN OF THE SHIPBOARD AIR DEFENSE
SYSTEM
A. DESIGNING RULES IN THE KNOWLEDGE BASE
In Artificial Intelligence, a representation of knowledge is a combination of
data structures and interpretive procedures that, if used in the right way in a
program, will lead to "knowledgeable" behavior,
Our Shipboard Air Defense System is a "rule-based" system which possesses
a large amount of knowledge in naval air defense and is able to develop a high
level support in tactical decision-making.
All the preplanned responses in our system are contained in a set of
inferential knowledge represented as production rules. The basic idea is that the





The use of the knowledge in our system involves retrieving rules relevant to
the problem at hand from the knowledge base and solving the problem. The
rules in the knowledge base are designed according to the defensive operational
procedures discussed in Chapter III. A simple example is listed below :
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************************************************************
RULE NUMBER : 1





RULE NUMBER : 2




RULE NUMBER : 3
IF : Target appears on radar
THEN Identify Friend or Foe
ELSE : Reset System
************************************************************
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Target not a friend
Check if Target is heading towards ship
Reset System
******************************************************* 'ft****
RULE NUMBER : 5
IF : Target is heading toward ship
THEN
:
Target status is hostile - verify
ELSE: Reset System
RULE NUMBER : 6
IF : Target shows - large intersection on radar
THEN : Target is fighter
ELSE : Target is missile
*************************************************************
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RULE NUMBER : 7
IF : Target is missile and appears on ESM
THEN
:
Target is radar-guided missile
ELSE: Target is anti-radiation or infrared/tv-guide missile
RULE NUMBER : 8
IF : Target is fighter
THEN Designate weapons for level 1 defense
************************************************************
RULE NUMBER : 9
IF : Target is radar-guided missile
THEN Turn on ECM; turn ship towards target; fire CHAFF
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RULE NUMBER : 10
IF : Target is anti-radiation missile
THEN
:
Turn off radar; turn ship towards target; fire CHAFF
RULE NUMBER : 1
1
IF : Target is infrared/tv-guide missile
THEN Turn ship towards target; fire CHAFF
RULE NUMBER : 12




designate weapons for level 1 defense
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RULE NUMBER : 13




RULE NUMBER : 14
IF : Fire defensive weapons
THEN Activate Level 2 defense
RULE NUMBER : 15





RULE NUMBER : 16





RULE NUMBER : 17
IF : CIWS firing
THEN Ship in danger - start praying
B. SOFTWARE IMPLEMENTATION
Given the above analysis on anti-ship weapons, counter attack measures, and
decision procedures in tactical situations, we have designed and implemented a
computer program that simulates the behavior of an intelligent air defense
system.
The program was written in C-Prolog and consists of two major
components: the inference engine and the rule base.
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1. The Inference Engine
The inference engine is basically a forward chaining interpreter. It
works from known facts and infers decisions based on the rules defining the
problem solving strategies. Its structure is as follows:
eval ( Action ) : -
rule ( Action ),
write ( Action ).
eval ( Condition ) : -
rule ( Condition , Action ),
eval (Condition ).
eval ( Condition ) : -
rule ( Condition , True_action , False action ),
query ( Condition , Reply ),
( affirmative ( Reply ) ->
eval ( True action );
eval ( False action )).
Once invoked, the interpreter fires the rule that has its condition
matched against the facts. The actions associated with the rule is then performed
and a new rule is fired based on this action.
The first clause above deals with the situation when a conclusion is
reached. The interpreter simply perform the action defined in the rule. The
second clause handles the unconditional rule where an action is always executed
when the condition specified in the rule is confirmed. The third clause is for
conditional rules when the condition has to be verified by some external oracle.
In the current program, the oracle is played by the system user. However, in a
40
battleship environment, this oracle can be a sensor or data-link that provides the
necessary information.
2. The Rule Base




where [ ... ] means the component is optional.
For example, the top level rules is:
rule ( 'Maintain electronic silence?',
'ESM intercept - target appears?',
'Open radar - target appears?' ).
which means if the ship maintains electronic silence, then ESM is in
open condition and is passively checking whether a target appears on ESM; on
the other hand, if the ship does not maintain electronic silence, then it will open
the radar and check whether a target appears on radar.
There are currently 17 rules in the rule base, representing air defense
knowledge in tactical situations. The rules developed for this thesis are
implemented in Prolog as follows:
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rule( 'Maintain electronic silence?' ,
'ESM intercept - target appears?',
'Open radar - target appears?' ).




'Maintain electronic silence?' ).
rule( 'Target on ESM'
,
'Open radar - target appears?' ).




'Maintain electronic silence?' ).
rule( 'Target on radar'
,
'IFF - Target a foe?' ).
rule( 'IFF - Target a foe?'
,
'Target heading toward ship?'
,
'Reset system' ).
rule( 'Target heading toward ship?'
,
'Target hostile - large intersection on radar?'
,
'Maintain electronic silence?' ).




'Target is missile - appearing on esm?' ).
rule( 'Target is missile - appearing on esm?'
,
'Target is radar-guided missile'
,
'Target is anti-radiation missile?' ).
rule( 'Target is anti-radiation missile?'
,
'Target is anti-radiation missile'
,
'Target is infrared/tv-guide missile' ).
rule( 'Target is fighter'
,
'Designate weapons for level 1 defense' ).
rule( 'Target is radar-guided missile'
,
'Turn on ECM; turn ship towards target; fire CHAFF ' ).




rule( 'Target is anti-radiation missile'
,
'Turn off radar; turn ship towards target; fire CHAFF ').
rule( 'Turn off radar; turn ship towards target; fire CHAFF '
,
'Interference successful?' ).
rule( 'Target is infrared/tv-guide missile'
,
'Turn ship towards target; fire CHAFF' ).







'Designate weapons for level 1 defense' ).
rule( 'Reset system'
,
'Maintain electronic silence?' ).
rule( 'Designate weapons for level 1 defense'
,
'Fire defensive weapons').
rule( 'Fire defensive weapons'
,
'Level 2 defense ready' ).
rule( 'Level 2 defense ready'
,
'Target destroyed or disappeared?' ).




'Can still defend against target?').







'Ship in danger - start praying' ).
rule( 'Ship in danger - start praying' ).
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C. Simulation Results
A simple way to evaluate a system's performance is to assess how
closely the system's performance satisfies the original goal. In this section, we
present some test runs on various tactical situations.
• Case 1 : Anti-radiation missile attack; Interference succeeds
Maintain electronic silence?
I : n. —Commander—
Open radar - target appear?
I : y. —Auto—
Targat on radar ...
IFF - Target a foe?
I : y. —Auto with confirm by Commander—
Target heading toward ship?
I : v.
—Auto—
Taregt hostile - large intersection on radar?
I : n. —size Auto, conform hostile by
Commander—
Target is missile - larget intersection on radar?
I : n. —Auto
—
Target is anti-radiation missile?
y. —confirm by Commander—
Target is anti- radiation missile ...
Turn off radar; turn ship towards target; fire CHAFF
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Interference successful?
I : v. —Auto—
Reset system ...
In this scenario, the ship operates with radars on, since it is not required to
maintain electronic silence. When a target appears on radars, is a foe, is
heading towards the ship, the system determines that it is hostile. The target also
appears small and is not visible on ESM. Therefore, it is classified as an anti-
radiation missile, and the system recommends actions such as turning off radars,
turning ship towards target, and firing CHAFF. When the interference succeeds,
the system is reset.
• Case 2: Radar guided missile attack; Countermeasure fails
Maintain electronic silence?
I : y. —Commander—
ESM intercept - target appear?
I : v. —Auto
—
Target on ESM ...
Open radar - target appears?
I : v. —Auto—
Target on radar ...
IFF - Target a foe?
I : v. —Auto with confirm by Commander---
Target heading toward ship?
I : y. —Auto—
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Target hostile - large intersection on radar?
I : n. —size Auto, confirm by Commander—
Target is missile - appearing on esm?
I : y. —Auto
—
Target is radar-guided missile ...





Designate weapons for level 1 defense ...
—confirm by Commander—
Fire defensive weapon ...
—confirm by Commander—
Level 2 defense ready ...
—confirm by Commander—
Target destroyed or disappeared?
I : n. —Auto-
Can still defend against target?
I : y. —Auto-
Fire defenive weapons ...
—confirm by Commander—
Level 2 defense ready ...
—confirm by Commander—
Target destroyed or disappeared?
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/ : n. —Auto-
Ca^ still defend against target?
I : n. —Auto
—
CIWS firing ...
Ship in danger - start praying ...
This scenario depicts the situation in which the ship's ESM intercepts a
threatening target, opens radars and IFF equipments to identify the target, fusing
all information and classifies the target as a radar guided missile. After ECM,
long- and medium-range defensive weapons fails to destroy the missile, the ship
is in extremly adverse condition and has to rely on CIWS firing for its survival.
• Case 3: Target is friend
Maintain electronic silence?
I : y. —Commander—
ESM intercept - target appear?
I : y. —Auto
Target on ESM ...
Open radar - target appears?
I : y. —Auto—
Target on radar ...
IFF - Target a foe?
I : n. —Auto with confirm by Commander—
Reset system ...
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In electronic silence condition, the ship's ESM intercepts a target bearing.
The ship opens radars and IFF equipments to identify the target and confirmed




This thesis examines the practicality of using expert system approach in
designing an intelligent air defense system to assist the Officer in Tactical
Command (OTC) to make efficient and accurate decisions in critical situations in
the battlefield. We outlined the problems and justified the need to automate the
air defense decision process in Chapter I. In Chapter II we traced the
development and analyzed the most effective anti-ship weapons including radar
guidance, anti-radiation, and infrared/tv-guidance missiles. We then discussed
the countermeasure tactics against anti-ship weapons in Chapter III. In Chapter
IV we explained the basic concepts in the structure, design, and construction of
expert systems. In Chapter V we presented a model based on discussions in
earlier chapters, in the form of a rule-based system. The software
implementation and simulation results were also detailed in the chapter.
B. FUTURE WORK
We have shown that the tactical knowledge, reasoning, and decisions in
combat situations can be modelled adequately using production rules and expert
system technology. However, to develop an automatic system operating in real-
time for air defense will require the incorporation of a lot more resources
including:
• multiple tracking sensors
• multiple weapons interfaces
• multiple tactical data link systems
• electronic warfare
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It will be ideal if all the available units can be integrated together to form a
complete combat system. Although this represents a long-term goal, we believe
some of the problems can be resolved using today's technology. Example
followups to this work include:
• How the expert system can automatically be combined with the
ship's air defense system ?
• How to make a man-machine interface between the expert
system and the Commander ?
• How to choose a expert system building tool for the intelligent
air defense expert system of ship ?
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